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White and Williams: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

WHERE HAVE ALL THE BUTTERFLIES
GONE? NINTH CIRCUIT
UPHOLDS DECISION TO
ALLOW INCIDENTAL TAKING

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen/ the
Ninth Circuit held that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) permit allowing the incidental taking of certain endangered
butterflies from San Bruno Mountain did not violate relevant
provisions of the Endangered Species Act2 and the National Environmental Policy Act. s In upholding a grant of summary judgment, the court rejected the contentions that the Service had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the permit, and
that an Environmental Impact Statement4 was necessary to enable the Service to adequately assess the environmental impacts
of the permit and planned development. II
II. FACTS
San Bruno Mountain contains about 3,400 acres of undevel1. 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985); (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Ferguson, J., and Curtis, D.J., Central District of California, sitting by designation).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
4. [d. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring an Environmental Impact Statement or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment). See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-1502.22 (1984) (stating the
details regarding the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement).
5. 760 F.2d at 988, 989.
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oped land located on the northern San Francisco peninsula. 6
Throughout the early 1970's Visitacion Associates purchased virtually all of the land on the mountain. 7 In 1975 Visitacion Associates proposed to develop 7,655 residential units, and 2,000
square feet of office and commercial space on the mountain. 6
This proposal encountered strong opposition from a local environmental group, the Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain. 9
Following intense controversy over the appropriate level of development of the mountain, San Mateo County adopted the San
Bruno Mountain General Plan Amendment in 1976. The General Plan Amendment permitted construction of 2,235 residential units, as well as some office and commercial space, and designated the remainder of the land on the mountain as open
space. 10
In 1980, litigation between Visitacion Associates and San
Mateo County over the General Plan Amendment was settled.
Under the terms of the settlement, Visitacion Associates sold
and donated to the county and the state of California over 2,000
acres of the mountain for park land. The county and Visitacion
Associates also agreed to designate about one-third of the mountain for development and two-thirds for parks. l l
Shortly after t1:te settlement was reached, the Service discovered that the Mission Blue Butterfly, which was on the endangered species list,12 inhabited the mountain. Following the
discovery of the Mission Blue, a two-year Biological Study13 was
initiated by the San Bruno Mountain Steering Committee 14 III
6. Id. at 979.
7.ld.
8.ld.
9.ld.
10.ld.
11.ld.
12. See generally 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.01·424.21 (1984) (providing rules for revising the
Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants and, where appropriate,
designating or revising their critical habitats).
13. The study technique employed was a mark·release-recapture of the butterflies.
This technique entails capturing individual butterflies and giving each a unique wing
identification mark. "The butterfly then is released where captured. When a butterfly is
recaptured, its identity and characteristics are re·recorded. By observing the proportion
of marked animals to unmarked animals in subsequent capture periods, experts infer the
population size and distribution of the butterfly in the study area." 760 F.2d at 980 n.4.
14. The Steering Committee consisted of representatives of San Mateo County, the
cities of Brisbane, Daly City, and South San Francisco, Visitacion Associates, other pro-
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order to determine the population and distribution of the Mission Blue Butterfly on the mountain, and to determine whether
development would conflict with the butterfly's continued
existence. IIi
In October 1981, the Steering Committee began developing
a Habitat Conservation Plan (Plan) to provide an approach by
which habitat protection and real estate development on the
mountain would take place at the same time!6 Under the
"Agreement with Respect to the San Bruno Mountain Area
Habitat Conservation Plan" (Agreement)17 implementing the
Plan, 793 privately-owned acres were to be dedicated to local
agencies as permanent open space, eighty-one percent of the
open space on the mountain was to be preserved as undisturbed
habitat, and another three percent of open space was to be restored after temporary disturbance during construction. 18 The
Plan and the Agreement also provided for the permanent protection of eighty-six percent of the Mission Blue's habitat, for
funding of $60,000 annually for habitat conservation and enhancement, and for continuing and comprehensive restrictions
on land development. 19
In July 1982, a combined Environmental Impact Report20
and Environmental Assessment21 of the Plan and proposed permit were made public for hearing and comment. 22 The Service
received both favorable and adverse comments, and in its permit
findings and final Environmental Impact ReportlEnvironmental
Assessment, considered and responded to these comments. 23
Then, in November 1982, the Service received a formal application for a permit for the incidental taking of the Mission Blue
spective developers, landowners, the Service, the California Department of Fish and
Game, and the Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain. Id. at 979, 980.
15. Id. at 980.
16. Id.
17. The Agreement was executed by the county, the cities, the major landowners
and developers, the California Department of Fish and Game, and the California Department of Parks and Recreation. Id. at 980.
18.Id.
19. Id. at 984.
20. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21165 (West 1986) (California law
governing the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report).
21. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (defining an Environmental Assessment).
22. 760 F.2d at 980.
23. [d. at 984.
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Butterfly.24
In March 1983, the Service issued a Biological Opinion concluding that the development planned under the permit would
not jeopardize the continued existence of the Mission Blue Butterfly on San Bruno Mountain. 211 The Service also issued a Finding of No Significant Impact26 stating that issuance of the permit would not significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. 26 Subsequently, the Service issued the permit, conditioned upon implementation of the Agreement and the Plan. 28
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 1983, Friends of Endangered Species filed an action in the district court for declaratory and injunctive relief. 29
Plaintiff contended that because the field studies were method010gically flawed, the Service's findings, relying on the field data,
were arbitrary and capricious, and that approval of the permit
based on such findings constituted an abuse of the agency's discretion. 30 Friends of Endangered Species also alleged that the
Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Assessment's discussion of environmental impacts and alternatives to development on the mountain was insufficient under NEP A, and that a
full Environmental Impact Statement was required. 31
In November 1983, plaintiff moved the district court for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt
certain grading work on the mountain. 311 Both motions were denied by the district court, and defendant's motion for summary
24. [d.

25. Id. 980, 981.
26. Id. at 981. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1984) (defining a Finding of No
Significant Impact).
27. 760 F.2d at 981. This finding obviated the need for an Environmental Impact
Statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See also Preservation Coalition, Inc. v.
Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982), where it was contended that NEPA had been violated by the failure to prepare an EIS for the Boise Downtown Center Redevelopment
Project. The court held an EIS was not required as it concluded that an Environmental
Assessment Finding of No Significant Impact was reasonable. Id. at 862.
28. 760 F.2d at 981.
29. 760 F.2d at 981.
30.Id.
31. Id.
32.Id.
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judgment was granted. 33 Following the ruling, Friends of Endangered Species appealed the grant of summary judgment to the
Ninth Circuit. 34
IV.
A.

BACKGROUND
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

The legislative development of endangered species protection in the United States began with the Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966.3~ In that Act, Congress recognized the
problem of the extermination of native species, and declared its
intention to prevent the elimination of endangered species. 36 In
this initial attempt at endangered species preservation, Congress
mandated that the various federal departments should seek to
protect species of native fish and wildlife threatened with extinction, and, insofar as practicable and consistent with the primary
purposes of such bureaus, agencies, and services should preserve
the habitats of threatened species on lands under their
jurisdiction. 37
With the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of

1973 38 Congress recognized that the provisions of the 1966 Act

were not sufficient to protect endangered species. Thus, in the
1973 Act, Congress expanded the scope of endangered species
protection to include endangered and threatened species, as well
as the ecosystems on which such species depend. 39 Furthermore,
33. [d. See 589 F. Supp. 113, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
34. 760 F.2d at 981.
35. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(1966), amended by Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135,
83 Stat. 282, 283 (1969), repealed by Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
36. "The purposes of this Act are to provide a program for the conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation of selected species of native fish and wildlife ... that
are threatened with extinction." Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
37. [d. at 80 Stat. 926.
38. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982».
39.
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened
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in this Act, Congress declared that all federal departments and
agencies should seek to conserve endangered species and
threatened species, and should utilize their authorities in furtherance of those purposes. 40 While there have been various
amendments since the enactment of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, most recently in 1982, the purpose and policy of the Act
remain essentially unchanged. 41
Aside from its general purpose of conserving endangered
and threatened species, a number of specific sections in the present version of the Endangered Species Act are relevant to the
court's decision in Friends. 42 Section 7(a)43 refers to federal
agency actions and consultations, and stipulates that "[e]ach
Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . . "44 Section 7(C)4C1 also provides for the preparation of a biological assessment to facilitate
compliance with the "not likely to jeopardize" clause. 46
While the Act generally prohibits the taking of any listed
species,47 it also provides for a number of exceptions. 48 Specifispecies, and to take such steps as may be appropriate . . . .
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982).
40. Id. § 1531(c) (1982).
41. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982) (stating the present version of the
Act).
42.Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1982).
44. Id. § 1536(a)(2). As interpreted and implemented in 50 C.F.R. § 402.01, section 7
imposes three burdens upon federal agencies: (1) to utilize their authorities to carry out
conservation programs for listed species; (2) to insure that its activities or programs will
not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species; and (3) to insure that their
activities or programs do not result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat. 60 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1984).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1982).
46. Id. Cf, 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(f) (1984) (requiring a federal agency to obtain additional information if it is determined that there is insufficient information to conclude
that an activity is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species).
47. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1982).
48. In the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the exceptions to the taking prohibition
were limited to acts for scientific purposes, or acts for the enhancement of propagation
or survival of the affected species. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205,
87 Stat. 884, 896 (1973). Largely due to the decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the allowable exceptions were greatly expanded. See generally
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cally, section 1049 permits "any taking otherwise prohibited.
if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."lIo Under this provision
an applicant must submit a conservation plan to the appropriate
federal agency which may authorize an incidental taking if it determines that (1) the taking will be incidental, (2) the applicant
will minimize and mitigate the impact of such taking, (3) the
applicant will insure that adequate funding for the plan will be
provided, and (4) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild. 111
The standard of review for administrative decisions under
the Endangered Species Act is of crucial importance. Because
the Act contains no internal standard of review, section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act ll2 governs. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the appropriate standard of review for
administrative decisions involving the Endangered Species Act
is the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law"1i3 standard. Applying this standard,
administrative action is upheld if the agency has "considered the
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made."1i4
Recently the United States Supreme Court expounded on
this standard and stated:
Normally, an agency [action] would be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider,
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982) (stating the various exceptions as they presently stand).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982).
50. [d. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
51. [d. § 1539(a)(2)(A), (B).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
53. [d. § 706(2)(A).
54. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87 (1983). The Court considered a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision
that licensing boards should assume, for purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage
of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact (the so-called
zero release aasumption) and thus should not affect the decision whether to license a
particular power plant. [d. at 90. The NRC in its statement announcing the rule, summarized the major uncertainties of long-term storage of nuclear waates, noted that the
probability of intrusion waa small, and found the evidence tentative but favorable that
an appropriate storage site could be found. [d. at 94. The Court upheld the NRC's rule,
finding its decision waa not arbitrary and capricious, and was within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking. [d. at 105.
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entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise. U
Furthermore, as the standard has been interpreted, the review under it is a limited one. For example, in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,r.o the Court stated that "[a]lthough
this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."117
In Stop H-3 Association v. Dole,1I8 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a question similar to that at issue in Friends. In Stop H3, the court considered whether an agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious, when the agency relied on a biological
opinion regarding an endangered species. 1I9 The appellants had
challenged the adequacy of the biological opinion as the basis for
a finding that a proposed highway project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a rare species of bird. 60 The
court concluded as a matter of law that the decision to rely on
the biological opinion was not arbitrary and capricious. 61 In the
court's view, there was no doubt that the agency had complied
with consultation obligations and relied on an opinion issued by
an expert agency.62 The testimony challenging the conclusions
55. Motor Vehicle Mfr's. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The Court
held that a decision by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinding
the requirement that motor vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped with
passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in the event of a
collision was arbitrary and capricious. [d. at 43.
56. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court, here, reviewed a decision by the Secretary of
Transportation to authorize construction of an interstate highway through a public park,
and reversed and remanded for a review of the Secretary's decision based upon the whole
record. [d. at 420. According to the Court, in deciding whether the Secretary's decision
was arbitrary and capricious a court "must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." [d. at 416.
57. [d.

58. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985).
59. 740 F.2d at 1458.
60. [d. at 1459.
61. [d. at 1460.
62. [d.
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contained in the biological opinion was unimportant as the testimony offered no information that had not already been evaluated by the expert agency.63 Thus, the agency's ultimate conclusion that the highway was not likely to jeopardize the existence
of the endangered species "clearly was grounded on a consideration of the relevant factors and, not being unreasonable as a
matter of law, was not a clear error of judgment. "64 As a result,
the court held that the agency had complied with the mandate
of the Endangered Species Act. 611
B.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

In enacting the National Environmental Policy Act, Congress declared its intention to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere."66 While such a statement seems to
indicate an intention to declare a national environmental policy,
the Code of Federal Regulations demonstrates that the real
function of NEP A is to insure that public officials and citizens
are informed about environmental effects before actions are
taken. 67 In accord with such a purpose, one of the key provisions
of NEP A is the requirement that all federal agencies include an
Environmental Impact Statement68 in every recommendation or
63. [d.
64. [d.
65. [d.

66. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
67. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1982). "NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made
and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing
NEPA." [d. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court reversed a decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia requiring additional information in an Environmental Impact Statement. "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation,
but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." [d. at 558.
68. Section 4332(C) defines an Environmental Impact Statement as a detailed statement of the responsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 10

102

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:93

report on proposals for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."69
As the Ninth Circuit has interpreted NEPA,70 its purpose is
"to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the present
and future environmental impact of their decisions."71 Thus, the
court's role is to ensure that the agency has taken a "hard look"
at environmental consequences. 72
When reviewing agency determinations that preparation of
an Environmental Impact Statement was not necessary, the
Ninth Circuit has consistently employed a reasonableness standard. 78 For example, in City of Davis v. Coleman,74 the court
reviewed a decision by the Federal Highway Administration not
to prepare an EIS for the construction of a freeway interchange.
Holding that an EIS was necessary, the court stated that its task
was to determine whether the responsible agency has reasonably
concluded that the project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences. 76 Thus, the court found that substantial questions about the environmental consequences of a federal
action had been raised, and that the "responsible agencies
should not be allowed to proceed with the proposed action in
ignorance of what those consequences will be."76
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
69. [d.

70. See Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.
1981), where the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision by an agency within the Department of
the Interior to authorize the construction of 500 kilovolt power transmission lines across
the lands of farmers. Plaintiff's primary contention was that the Environmental Impact
Statement on the proposed power line was not in conformance with NEPA.
71. [d. at 592.
72. [d. (citing with approval Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976».
73. The Ninth Circuit has also employed a reasonableness standard in determining
the adequacy of the contents of an Environmental Impact Statement. "The adequacy of
the contents of an EIS is determined by a rule of reason, which requires only a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant 89pects of the probable environmental consequences." Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th
Cir. 1981).
74. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
75. [d. at 673 (citing Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir.
1973».
76. 521 F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975).
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In Foundation For North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,77 the court expounded upon that
theme. When considering an agency's determination that reopening a road in the Angeles National Forest would not have
an impact upon a herd of Bighorn sheep the court stated that
"[i]t is firmly established in this Circuit that an agency's determination that a particular project does not require the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement is to be upheld unless unreasonable."78 In finding that preparation of an EIS was
necessary, the court held that the agency had failed to take the
requisite "hard look" at the environmental consequences, 'and
that the agency's conclusion that reopening the road would have
no significant effect was unreasonable. 79
Also relevant to the court's decision in the present case, are
the requirements that an agency discuss reasonable alternatives
to a proposed action,80 and include a worst-case scenario where
information is incomplete or unavailable. 81 As to the requirement of a discussion of reasonable alternatives, the Ninth Circuit has made its position quite clear. In State of California v.
Block,82 the court reviewed an Environmental Impact Statement
for a Forest Service decision to allocate roadless national forest
system land among three management categories. Holding that
the Forest Service did not consider an adequate range of alternatives, the court stated that "[j]udicial review of the range of
alternatives considered by an agency is governed by a 'rule of
reason' that requires an agency to set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a 'reasoned choice.' "83
77. 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982).
78. [d. at 1177.
79. [d. at 1178.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1982).
81. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1984). A worst case analysis is required if
(1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to
a reasoned choice among alternatives and is not known and
the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant, or (2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision and the means to obtain it are not known . . . .
[d. § 1502.22(b).
82. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
83. [d. at 767. "An EIS, however, need not consider an alternative whose effect cannot be reasonably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed remote and speculative." [d. (citing Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981».
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The requirement of a worst-case scenario was considered in
Save Our Ecosystems v. Clarks. where the spraying of herbicides
on Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management lands was
challenged. Holding that the worst case analysis was inadequate,
the court assessed that "[t]he purpose of the [worst case] analysis is to carry out NEP A's mandate for full disclosure to the
public of the potential consequences of agency decisions, and to
cause agencies to consider those potential consequences when
acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or gaps in available
information. S~
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
This case involved alleged violations of two distinct acts,
which the court examined independently. The analysis began
with an examination of the Endangered Species Act, followed by
an examination of the National Environmental Policy Act.
A.

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court began with appellant's contention that the Service's issuance of a permit was a violation of sections 10(a)S6 and
7(a)(2)S7 of the Endangered Species Act. The question posed to
the court was whether the appellant had raised a genuine issue
of material fact in asserting that the Service acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in issuing the permit under the Act. 88
Under section 10(a)89 of the Endangered Species Act, the
Service may permit an applicant to engage in the "taking" of an
endangered species under certain circumstances. 9o Appellant
challenged the sufficiency of the permit findings as to whether
the applicant would minimize and mitigate the impacts of the
84. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984).
85. [d. at 1244.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982).
87. [d. § 1536(a)(2).
88. 760 F.2d at 982.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982).
90. "Taking" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19)
(1982).
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taking to the maximum extent practicable, and whether the taking would not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival
of the species. 91
In its analysis of appellant's claims, the court began by examining whether the field study adequately supported the Service's finding that the taking would not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival of the species. 92 According to the court,
the Service went beyond this minimum requirement in concluding that the permit and Plan were likely to enhance the survival
of the Mission Blue Butterfly.98 The court rejected appellant's
contention that the Service's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious because of alleged shortcomings -in the. Biological Study
upon which the conclusion was based. 94 In the court's view, the
legislative history of the 1982 amendment to section 10(a) indicated that the Service acted properly in relying on the Biological
Study.911 That legislative history suggests that Congress would
view appellee's conduct in the present case as the paradigm approach to compliance with section 10(a).96
The court also found that the appellant had failed to bring
many of the purported errors and inconsistencies in the field
study to the attention of the Service until after the district court
had denied their motion for summary judgment.97 Furthermore,
the Service solicited and considered expert and public comment
on the Biological Study before issuing the permit, and the study
itself acknowledged methodological limitations. 98 There was no
evidence that the permit was issued either in ignorance or delib91. 760 F.2d at 982. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (ii), (iv), (1982) (permitting an otherwise prohibited taking under certain circumstances).
92. 760 F.2d at 982.
93. [d. According to the Service the species' survival would be enhanced because a
substantial amount of its critical habitat would be transferred to public ownership, and a
permanent program to protect its habitat would be established. [d. at 982 n.6.
94. [d. at 982. Friends of Endangered Species contended that low recapture rates
and mistaken recaptures by the field crew in the mark-release-recapture phase of the
study invalidated the study's conclusions. [d.
95. [d. at 983 (citing S. REP. No. 418, 97TH CON G., 20 SESS. 10 (1982), ANO H.R. REP.
NO. 835, 97TH CONG., 20 SESS. 31-32 (1982)).
96. 760 F.2d at 982, 983 (citing with approval S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1982), and H.R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982)).
97. 760 F.2d at 983.
98. [d.
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erate disregard of the Biological Study's limitations. 99 Instead,
the Service made an effort to consider all criticisms of the Biological Study before relying on it.loO Thus, the court held that
there were no genuine issues of material fact to preclude the district court from determining that the Service had complied with
the Endangered Species Act, and that the Service had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in relying on the Biological Study. 101
The next issue concerned whether the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the Habitat Conservation Plan complied with section lO(a)'s requirement to minimize and mitigate the impact of the taking upon endangered
species. l02 Appellant's primary contention was that the development of an alternative site on the mountain, the Saddle Area,
would more effectively mitigate the effects of development. l03
However, the court found that the Service had considered and
rejected development of the Saddle Area on the basis that it
contained unique wetlands and endangered plants, and that its
development would have biological impacts greater than that
produced by the Saddle's proposed use as a country park. l04
Furthermore, the Plan contained various measures to minimize
and mitigate the impact of development upon the Mission Blue
Butterfly, and these additional measures would playa significant
role in enhancing the protection of endangered species on the
mountain. 1011 Thus, the court concluded that there was no genuine factual dispute as to whether the Service acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably in determining that the Plan complied with section lO(a)'s mitigation requirement}06
The court next analyzed appellant's claim that the Service
failed to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA!07 Under this
section, a federal agency is required to "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
99.Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 984.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982).
103. 760 F.2d at 984.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
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species."108 Accordingly, the Service determined that the permit
was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Mission Blue Butterfly.l09 Appellant challenged this conclusion on
the basis that the source relied upon by the Service did not represent the best scientific data available. uo This contention was
rejected by a finding that the Service addressed the limitations
of the Biological Study, was not directed to any better available
data, and considered whatever data and other materials appellant provided. l l l The court cited Stop H-3 Association v. Dolel12
for the proposition that when examining an alleged violation
under section 7(a)(2), "the issue for review is' whether-the
[agency's] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."llS
Accordingly, the court held the Service did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously, or in violation of section 7(a)(2), by considering all
the data it received. u ,
B.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

In its examination of alleged violations of NEPA in Friends,
the court began by announcing it would proceed to review the
Service's actions concerning the NEP A provisions at issue under
a reasonableness standard.116 The first alleged NEP A violation
examined was appellant's contention that issuance of the permit
required preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement in
addition to the Environmental Impact Report/Environmental
Assessment. u6 This contention essentially concerned whether
the Service erred in issuing its Finding of No Significant Impact.
In examining the Service's decision in this regard, the court
pointed out that the decision not to prepare an EIS should be
108. Id.
109. 760 F.2d at 984, 985.
110. Id. at 985. Section 7(a) of the Endangered Species Act further states that "[i]n
fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and
commercial data available." Codified at 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (1982).
111. 760 F.2d at 985.
112. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying note 58. See also
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
113. 760 F.2d at 985 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740.F.2d 1442, 1459 (9th Cir.
1984)).
114. 760 F.2d at 985.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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upheld if reasonable,117 and that a court should not substitute
its judgment for that of an agency if the agency's decision was
fully informed and well considered.1I8 Thus, it was noted that
the Service had sought out and considered extensive comments
on the Biological Study during the public comment period and
afterward, and incorporated these comments into its permit
findings and final Plan. lie
Furthermore, the extensive coordination and agreement between the state and federal government was a factor supporting
the Service's decision not to prepare an EIS.120 Finally, the likelihood of the enhancement of the chances for survival of the endangered species, due to the mitigation measures in the permit
and the Plan, was an additional factor in support of the Service's decision not to prepare an EIS.121 Thus, the court concluded that the Service acted reasonably in not preparing an
EIS, and that to overturn the Service's decision would represent
an unjustifiable intrusion into the administrative process. 122
Next, the court rejected appellant's claim that the Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Assessment did not adequately discuss reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 123
Under NEPA, all agencies of the federal government are to include in any recommendation or report on major federal actions
117. See supra text accompanying note 78.
118. 760 F.2d at 986 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). Vermont Yankee further stated that
"[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for
substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute ... not simply
because the court is unhappy with the result reached." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. at 558.
119. 760 F.2d at 986.
120. [d. at 987.
121. Regarding the level of mitigation measures in determining whether preparation
of an Environmental Impact Statement is necessary, see Preservation Coalition, Inc. v.
Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982), where the Ninth Circuit held that "modifications to
the original design ... may eliminate or mitigate the project's effects on air quality.
These modifications may make the preparation of an EIS unnecessary." [d. at 860. Compare Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which
it was held that an Environmental Impact Statement was not required when a proposal
is modified "by adding specific mitigation measures which completely compensate for
any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal . . . . "
[d. at 682 (emphasis added).
122. 760 F.2d at 987 (citing Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d
678, 684 (9th Cir. 1982)).
123. 760 F.2d at 987.
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significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed
statement on alternatives to the proposed action. 124 As the court
noted, this provision does not demand a full discussion of all
land-use alternatives.l2Ci In the present case, the EIR/EA listed
various alternatives to issuance of the permit, including those of
no development, more limited development, and public acquisition of all private land on the mountain. 126 Additionally, the
EIR/EA contained a brief discussion on the alternate development of the Saddle Area and rejected it.127 This, according to
the court, amounted to an adequate discussion of reasonable
alternatives. 128
Finally, appellant challenged the Service's action on the basis that NEP A requires the EIR/EA to contain a "worst case
analysis."129 This claim was rejected as the court concluded that
the Service obtained the impact information it needed from the
Biological Study and Plan, and included it in the EIR/EA.lsO
Moreover, the court determined that the staged development of
the mountain, and corresponding staged reconsideration of environmental impacts under the Plan, functioned to minimize the
importance of a "worst case analysis" in the present case. lSI
VI. CRITIQUE
The present decision is appropriate in a number of respects.
The court recognized and applied the traditional standards of
review to the alleged violations of the Endangered Species Act
and the National Environmental Policy Act. It realized that its
function is to insure that the decision of an agency is based upon
a consideration of the relevant evidence and factors, and that it
is not to substitute its judgment for that of an agency. The court
properly recognized and applied the "hard look" doctrine as an124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1982).
See supra text accompanying note 82.
760 F.2d at 988.
[d.
[d. at 987.
[d. at 988.

130. [d.

131. [d. See also Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (a
worst-case analysis was not required at the first stage of a project where each stage remained separate, and a worst case analysis could be considered at a later stage).
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nounced by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 132
From the evidence presented, it was determined that the Service
had considered the relevant evidence and factors, and that the
Service's decision was not unreasonable in view of that information. The court properly deferred to the judgment of the appropriate agency and declined to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.
On another level, the present decision does not permit the
destruction of the Mission Blue Butterfly.13s The provisions of
ESA and NEP A have successfully limited development on San
Bruno Mountain to approximately one-fifth of the available
space. 13• The developers voluntarily agreed to a number of requirements designed to enhance the likelihood of survival of the
Mission Blue Butterfly.131! In fact, the court found the virtual
agreement among government officials, private parties, and local
environmentalists on the development of the mountain to be a
persuasive factor favoring the Service. ISS On this level, upholding the Service's decision to permit development, represents a
valid compromise between the goals of development and the
goals of preservation of endangered species and preservation of
the environment.
Nevertheless, this case also presents a number of grounds
for concern. For the most part, the plaintiff's contentions revolved around substantive criticism of the Biological Study, and
the claim that errors in that Study rendered conclusions based
upon it invalid. 137 Yet, the court did not seriously examine this
claim. Despite the language of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
132. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe the Court stated that "[tJhe only role for a
court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences;
it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
action to be taken.' .. [d. at 410 n.21 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972».
133. Under the Plan and the Agreement, 86% of the Mission Blue's habitat is to be
protected. 760 F.2d at 984.
134. The Agreement provides that 81 % of the open space on the mountain is to be
preserved as undistrubed habitat with another three percent of open space to be restored
after temporary disturbances during construction. [d. at 980.
135. [d. at 984.
136. [d. at 986. As the court stated, "the extensive coordination and agreement between the state and federal government is a factor supporting the Service's decision not
to prepare an [Environmental Impact Statement]." [d. at 987.
137. [d. at 981.
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Species Act,188 requiring an agency to insure that its actions are
not likely to jeopardize an endangered species, there was no
showing by the Service that the study was accurate, or that its
conclusions were valid. The court reasoned that the Service had
examined the impact of the issuance of the permit upon the
Mission Blue Butterfly, and that therefore the Finding of No
Significant Impact was not arbitrary and capricious. lS9 Yet, the
legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the ESA140 indicate that section 7(a)(2)141 was intended to give the benefit of
the doubt to the species, and to place the burden on the agency
to demonstrate that its action will not jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered species. 142 As the court's reasoning
illustrates, rather than placing the burden on the Service to
uemonstrate that its actions were not likely to jeopardize the
Mission Blue, the court placed the burden on the plaintiff to
show that the Service's action was likely to jeopardize the endangered species.
Similarly, the court found that the Biological Study adequately supported the Service's findings. us This conclusion is
apparently based upon the congressional language surrounding a
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
139. As the court stated, "the Service was aware of all relevant limitations on the
Biological study and the field data, and the Service addressed those limitations in its
Permit Findings." 760 F.2d at 985.
140. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2576. See also Note, Hammond v. North Slope Borough:
The Endangered Species Issue-An Exercise In Judicial Lethargy, 1 ALASKA L. REV.
129, 137 (1984).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
142. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2576:
This language continues to give the benefit of the doubt to the
species, and it would continue to place the burden on the action agency to demonstrate to the consulting agency that its
action will not violate Section 7(a)(2). Furthermore, the language will not absolve Federal agencies from the responsibility
of cooperating with the wildlife agencies in developing adequate information upon which to base a biological opinion. If a
Federal agency proceeds with the action in the face of inadequate knowledge or information, the agency does so with the
risk that it has not satisfied the standard of Section 7(a)(2)
and that new information might reveal that the agency has not
satisfied the standard of Section 7(a)(2).
Id.
143. 760 F.2d at 984.
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1982 amendment to the Endangered Species Act. lH Yet, an ex-

amination of that language reveals that both the Senate and the
House were focusing primarily on the Habitat Conservation Plan
rather than the Biological Study. The Senate Report focused on
the Conservation Plan for San Bruno Mountain, not the Field
Study.l411 In fact, in the Senate Report, the Field Study is not
even mentioned. l46 In the House Report, mention is made of the
Field Study, but only that it was independent and exhaustive
and provided support for the Conservation Plan. 147 From the
comments in the House Report, it is clear that the House did
not concern itself with the accuracy of the Field Study.l48 Thus,
the court's reliance on the language surrounding the 1982
amendment to the Endangered Species Act is misplaced. Although the Service followed the proper procedure in authorizing
a Biological Study, the court did not require the Service to
demonstrate the adequacy or accuracy of that study.
A secondary concern is the level of review the court utilized
in this case. The court has applied the appropriate standard of
review, and recognized its role as a limited one. Yet, there is a
distinction between a limited role and a non-existent role. For
example, the Supreme Court stated in Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe 149 that the generally applicable standards
of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act require the
reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry.lllo An agency's
144. S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982), and H. R. REP. No. 835, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982).
145. S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982) states that the "project developer, in cooperation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and State authorities is
developing a conservation plan for the protection and enhancement of the butterflies
habitat, to be financed through an assessment on home owners." [d.
146. [d.

147. H. R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982) states:
Prior to developing the conservation plan, the County of San
Mateo conducted an independent, exhaustive biological study
which determined the location of the butterflies, and the location of their food plants. The biological study also developed
substantial information regarding the habits and life cycles of
the butterflies and other species of concern. The biological
study was conducted over a two year period and at one point
involved 50 field personnel.
[d.
148. [d.

149. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
150. [d. at 415.
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decision may be entitled to a presumption of regularity, but
such a presumption does not shield its action from a thorough
review. llli In the present decision a thorough, probing, in-depth
review was not undertaken. Careful scrutiny of the agency's decision would have been possible without the court substituting
its judgment for that of the Service. Yet, the review was so limited that serious questions about the accuracy of the Biological
Study, and the continued existence of the Mission Blue Butterfly remain.
Finally, the present case has potentially serious implications
for the future of the Endangered Species Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act. The Service's decision to allow development, knowing of the limitations of the Biological Study, does
not appear to be consistent with the goals of those acts. 11l2 Given
the concern for the environment, and the purposes and policies
announced by ESA and NEPA, is it enough to recognize limitations in a Biological Study, or should a decision to allow development have been postponed until such limitations could be
substantively addressed? In allowing the Service's decision to
stand, the implication for future activity is that an agency
merely has to comply with the procedural requirements of the
respective acts. If one of the goals of these acts is to foster the
incorporation of biological conservation considerations into the
planning process from the beginning, the present decision suggests that form is more important than substance. For example,
if an agency undertakes a Biological Study and incorporates its
conclusions into a development plan, it would be sufficient to
pass judicial scrutiny under the standard set out in Friends.
While it is important that agencies follow the proper procedure under the Endangered Species Act and under NEP A, it is
up to the judicial system to insure that agencies do not lose sight
of the substantive goals of those acts. While a court may not be
capable of resolving scientific uncertainties, and should not substitute its judgment for that of an expert agency, it can require
an agency to demonstrate that its actions will not jeopardize the
existence of an endangered species. Thus, while a court should
properly defer to the expertise of an agency when the basis for
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 and 66-67.
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an agency's decision is called into question, an affirmative showing by the agency supporting that decision should be required.
VII. CONCLUSION
Friends follows the accepted trend of a limited role for the
courts in challenges to proposed actions under the Endangered
Species Act and NEP A. The Ninth Circuit has traditionally applied a deferential standard in reviewing the decisions of an
agency, and this decision represents another example of that
deference. Although the present decision raises questions as to
whether the court has insured that the Service took a "hard
look" at the environmental consequences of development on San
Bruno Mountain, the court upheld the judgment of the Service,
and affirmed the standards it will use in reviewing future challenges to agency decisionmaking in environmental issues.
Steven White*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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SIERRA CLUB v. F.E.R.C.: A PRELIMINARY PERMIT
DOES NOT CREATE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission l
the Ninth Circuit decided that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission)2 need not prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement when issuing a preliminary permitS for construction of a hydroelectric project, since this type of permit
does not authorize anyon-site activity which might affect the
environment. 4 The court also concluded that the Commission
may issue a preliminary permit for such a project without deciding whether it will ultimately be able to license the project. II
1. 754 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Poole, J.; the other panel members were
Canby, J. and Phillips, J., Senior United States Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit, sitting
by designation).
2. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the successor to the Federal Power
Commission, licenses hydroelectric facilities on waters under federal jurisdiction. Applicants provide the Commission with information regarding feasibility, compliance with
state law and environmental impact. 16 U.S.C. § 802 (1976); 18 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1985). The
Commission is then responsible for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1976).
3. Due to the lengthy licensing procedure, the Commission is authorized to issue a
preliminary permit, the sole purpose of which is to preserve the applicant's priority over
later applications for a maximum of three years. 16 U.S.C. § 797(0 (1976). The preliminary permit is designed to maintain the status quo while the permittee prepares a detailed license application. [d. § 798.
4. 754 F.2d at 1510.
5. [d.

115
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Consequently, the Sierra Club's challenge to the Commission's
jurisdiction under the Raker ActS to license the project was
premature. 7
II. FACTS
In June 1976, the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts
applied for a preliminary permit for a new hydroelectric project,
to be known as Clavey-Wards Ferry Project. 8 The proposed 400
million watt project was to be constructed on the Tuolumne
River near its confluence with the Clavey River, an area on federal land managed by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management. 9 Because the outstanding recreational opportunities provided by the river would be impaired by the hydroelectric development, the Sierra Club, Tuolumne Rivers Expeditions, Inc., and the State of California intervened before the
Commission to oppose the application. to However, the Commission granted the permit in April 1983. 11 The Sierra Club and
Tuolumne River Expeditions, Inc., petitioned the Ninth Circuit
for a review of the Commission's issuance of the permit without
prior preparation of an EIS, and for a ruling on the Commis6. Raker Act, ch. 4, 38 Stat. 242 (1913). The Raker Act allowed San Francisco to
flood the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park, and to build water and electrical transmission systems through the Park. The Hetch Hetchy water and power system was put under the jurisdiction of the Departments of Agriculture and Interior to the
exclusion of any other federal agencies. Raker Act, 38 Stat. 242 § 4.
7. 754 F.2d at 1511.
8. Id. at 1508. As originally proposed, the project would include the Jawbone Diversion Dam and Reservoir, the 5.2 mile Jawbone Ridge Tunnel, the Hunter Point Dam, the
2 mile Clavey Power Conduit, the Ward's Ferry Dam, and the Clavey and Ward's Ferry
Powerhouses. Id.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 1509. This area is widely known for its whitewater and kayaking opportunities. Id.
After this case was first submitted to the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed the California Wilderness Act of 1984 which amended the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems
Act by adding part of the Tuolumne River to the system. 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1984). The
court vacated submission of the case, and invited the parties to express their views on
the effect of this new legislation. Subsequently, relying on the statute's plain language,
the court decided that the California Wilderness Act did not preclude the issuance of a
preliminary permit for this potential project because the project is outside the boundary
of the statutorily designated Wild and Scenic River Area. 754 F.2d at 1509 n.l.
11. Id. at 1508. Under the preliminary permit, the irrigation district would be allowed to maintain priority of application, in the event of possible subsequent licensing
applications. It would not be authorized to enter federal land and conduct any studies
which might disturb the environment. Id. at 1509.
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sion's jurisdiction to issue a permit under the Raker Act. 111
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the Commission was required to prepare an EIS prior to the issuance of a
preliminary permit. It then addressed the challenge raised by
the Sierra Club to the Commission's jurisdiction to issue the
permit.

A.

BACKGROUND

The starting point of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of whether
an EIS was required was the National Environmental Policy
Act 13 which provides that a federal agency must issue an EIS
whenever a major federal action significantly affects the human
environment. 14 The Ninth Circuit has expanded this requirement to include those actions which may affect the environ12. The federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review orders of the Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)(2) (1976) provides that all Americans are to be assured
"safe, healthy, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings." In
order to fulfill these goals, the Act mandates that a federal agency must prepare a detailed statement called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) whenever "major federal actions significantly affect the human environment." [d. § 4332 (2)(C). The purpose
of an EIS is to force all federal agencies to take environmental factors into account during the decision-making process, giving such factors the same weight as other, more
traditional concerns such as productivity and efficiency. 40 C.F.R. § 1500. 1 (1985). See
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109,
1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971). NEPA also created the Council on Environmental Quality to carry
out the Act's goals. 42 U.S.C. § 4371, Executive Order No. 11,514 (March 5, 1970), 3
C.F.R., 1966-70 comp., p. 1902. The regulations require an EIS to relate where and how
the environment will be affected by the proposed federal action or decision, and also set
forth alternatives to the planned action that would avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts. Moreover, alternatives must be considered that would enhance the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1985).
An Environmental Assessment is a preliminary step in the NEPA process. The Environmental Assessment must briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine if an EIS is required, facilitate preparation of an EIS if such is found to be necessary, and aid the federal agency in complying with NEPA if no EIS is required. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9 (1985).
The scope of NEPA is intentionally broad, in that it attempts to promote acrossthe-board adjustment in federal agency decisionmaking. Scientists' Institute for Public
Information v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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ment. Iii When reviewing a federal agency's determination that
no EIS is required prior to the issuance of a permit, it is firmly
established in this circuit that an agency's decision will be upheld unless found to be unreasonable. 16 It is also firmly established that, if a permit does not authorize any change in the environmental status quo, it is not unreasonable to dispense with
the EIS requirement prior to issuance. 17
B.

DISCUSSION

In Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
the Sierra Club claimed that the Commission was required to
prepare an EIS before issuing a preliminary permit to the irrigation districts for the Clavey-Wards Ferry Project!8 However, the
preliminary permit was intended only to maintain the priority of
application, and it prohibited anyon-site construction, testing,
15. Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. USDA, 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982). The
Forest Service allowed the reopening of a road that crossed one of the last remaining
habitats of Desert Bighorn Sheep without preparing an EIS. [d. at 1176. The court held
this decision to be unreasonable, since the Environmental Assessment on which the Service based its decision had glaring omissions such as failing to consider the amount of
traffic the road would carry and the effect of this traffic on a variety of factors that might
impact on the sheep. A determination that significant effects will in fact occur is not
necessary in order that NEPA's exceptionally broad scope may be fulfilled. If substantial
questions are raised as to whether a project may have a significant effect, an EIS must be
prepared. [d. at 1178 (emphases in original).
16. [d. at 1177. A standard of reasonableness is a higher standard requiring a greater
showing of agency effort than an arbitrary and capricious standard. [d. at 1177 n.24. See
also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d
466, 475 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasonableness standard higher than arbitrary and capricious
standard), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2358 (1985). To satisfy this standard, the federal
agency is required to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences. Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21. (1976). Although the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, if the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show that
the environment may be significantly affected, the agency must address these issues, or
its determination not to issue an EIS will be held to be unreasonable. Found. for N. Am.
Wild Sheep v. FERC, 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing City and County of San
Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1980».
17. Sierra Club, 754 F.2d at 1510. See Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt,
623 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1980). Since federal action in aiding a private group to buy an
existing airport did not increase the noise level, the status quo did not change, and no
EIS was required. [d. at 116. See also South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied 449 U.S. 822 (1980). The granting of a mining patent by the Department of
the Interior did not allow the patent holders to take any action; rather, permits from the
Forest Service would be required before anyon-site activity could be undertaken. Therefore, no EIS was mandated. [d. at 1195.
18. 754 F.2d at 1509.
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or feasibility studies. 19 The permit clearly required the irrigation
districts to seek approval from the Forest Service, which managed the land under consideration, before beginning work on the
project.20 The Forest Service, not the Commission, would therefore be responsible for determining the environmental effects of
the irrigation districts' proposed actions when an application for
a special use permit was filed. 21 Since the Sierra Club was unable to point to any environmental impact which would result
from the Commission's issuance of the permit, the court upheld
the agency's decision that no EIS was required. 22
The court next turned to the Sierra Club's claim that although the proposed project is outside the original Raker Act
right-of-way, it would be an extensiQn of San Francisco's Hetch
Hetchy hydroelectric system, and, as such, outside the Commission's jurisdiction under the Raker Act. 23 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the jurisdictional challenge was premature. 24 Since the proposed project would be subject to extensive
change during the preliminary project planning stage, its relationship to Hetch Hetchy could not as yet be determined. 211 The
Commission was not required to deny the preliminary permit on
the speculative ground that it might ultimately be unable to li19. [d.
20. [d.

21. [d. Special use permits are required by Forest Service Regulations before beginning most on-the-ground investigations. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2771.2.
22. 754 F.2d at 1510. The Ninth Circuit also quickly rejected two additional arguments made by the Sierra Club. First, the Sierra Club claimed that 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4
required the Commission to file an Environmental Assessment to establish the reasonableness of its decision not to prepare an EIS. See supra note 14. The court concluded,
however, the Commission's permit satisfied this requirement because it provided the factual basis for determining that there would be no significant effect on the environment as
a result of the issuance of the permit. 754 F.2d at 1510.
Second, the Sierra Club argued that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary hearing. [d. CEQ regulations require such a hearing when there is a substantial
environmental controversy. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.2(b)(4) (1985). A "controversy" does not
mean opposition, however, but a dispute as to environmental effects. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). In the instant
case, there was no environmental controversy because there would be no environmental
effect stemming from the issuance of the preliminary permit. Therefore, a hearing was
not required. Sierra Club, 754 F.2d at 1510.
23. 754 F.2d at 1510.
24. The Act gives sole jurisdiction over the Hetch Hetchy system to the Secretaries
of Agriculture and the Interior. Raker Act, 38 Stat. 242 § 4 (1913). See supra note 6.
25. 754 F.2d at 1511.
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cense the project under the Raker Act. 26 The risk that the project will be unlicensable at some future time, the court noted, is
one being eagerly borne by the irrigation district. 27
III. CONCLUSION
The court properly found that it was premature to claim a
Raker Act violation when the proposed project had not yet been
finally delineated. In striking down the Raker Act challenge, the
court relied upon the broad principle that the Commission need
not consider potential problems with licensure at the preliminary permit stage. Indeed, since the preliminary permit is
designed only to maintain priority of application while a detailed license application is being prepared, to sustain a jurisdictional challenge would predetermine issues properly raised only
when the application itself is submitted.
In rejecting the Sierra Club's petition for review, the Ninth
Circuit determined that although the mandate of NEP A was to
force federal action to meet certain environmental criteria, the
Act required an EIS only for those major federal actions which
significantly affect the environment. 26 Even under the Ninth
Circuit's expansive interpretation of NEPA, it correctly concluded here that the Sierra Club had failed to establish the
threshold requirement for an EIS, that is, a showing of environmental impact. Simply stated, the case stands for the proposition that where no environmental effect can be demonstrated, no
EIS is required. Yet the implications of the case may be far26. See City of Bedford v. FERC, 718 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (not necessary for
the Commission to determine whether an applicant for a preliminary permit will meet all
the qualifications for licensing before issuing the permit).
The proposed Clavey-Ward's Ferry project has, in fact, changed considerably since
the irrigation districts first applied for a preliminary permit. Two of the originally proposed dams have been dropped, and the project has been renamed the "Ponderosa Project." 754 F.2d at 1511 n.3.
27. 754 F.2d at 1511. The court noted that no other Tuolumne River hydroelectric
project that has operated in conjunction with Raker Act facilities has been barred by the
Act. 754 F.2d at 1511 (citing California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917, 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 941 (1965». In California v. FPC, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the granting of
licenses for the New Don Pedro Dam, which is outside the original Raker Act right-ofway, and immediately downstream from the proposed project, and concluded that the
Raker Act did not bar the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license to operate.
345 F.2d at 930.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
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reaching. Environmental groups seeking to block future projects
may now be foreclosed from demanding an EIS in the preliminary planning stage, and thus may have to delay an attack until
the project is more mature.
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